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JURISDICTION & NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Th i s appea] Is from a fI nal judgment of the Second 
Judicial District Court denying Plaintiff's Motion to Set Aside 
Decree, This Court has - irlsdicti on over this appeal pursi lant 
ti dr '_ae ,wtr.
 fv-/a-1f?)(g) (11 987) • 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
] Wa s D e f e n d a i 11f s i n t e n 11 o n a. 1 in i s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f h i s 
income earning capacity conduct which should have resulted in 
the setting aside of the Divorce Decree grounds of tra ;•: 
in i s r e p i: e s e n t a t i o n, in i s c <:> i I d i i c t o i: in. i s t a k e ? 
Was Plaintiff's Rule 60(b) Motion to set aside the 
Decree \ ^  proper procedure for remedying the unfair result 
caused - > -dant's intentional misrepresentation? 
STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Rule 60(b)
 s Utah Rul es :>f Ci vi 1 Pi 'ocedure. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On February 22, 1988, Plaintiff filed a Complaint for 
Divorce in the Second luc - . : ^\ , 3 County. 
The Complaint was served upon Defendant >: ^ r r h . 1988, and 
Defendant filed an Answer on March 22 r 1988, and an Amended 
Answe r \)?i Ma r c h 11\» 1 '"* B8 . 
ft hearing was held on October 5, 1988 f the Honorable 
Maurice Richards, Domestic Relations Commissioner for the 
Second JUCIM, id J District Coin r. or Davis County presiding. Both 
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parties, with their counsel, were present and stipulated that 
the Commissioner could sit as judge pro tempore. The parties 
reached a stipulation on a majority of issues which was read 
into the record. Also, evidence was heard at this hearing, and 
as part of that evidence it was indicated that Defendant 
represented that he had recently changed positions with his 
employer and that his future income was to be $1,500.00 per 
month. (See Transcript of Hearing, pp. 6 and 7.) Following 
the hearing, the parties finalized their Stipulation, based 
upon the representations made during settlement negotiations 
and the testimony at the hearing, and Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law and a Decree of Divorce were entered 
pursuant thereto on October 19, 1988. Finding of Fact No. 8 
specifically provided, inter alia; "This child support payment 
is based upon Defendant's change of position with his company 
and his proffer that his income will be $1,500.00 per month for 
the foreseeable future." (R. at 66). 
Subsequent to entering into the Stipulation, and 
subsequent to the entry of the Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law and Decree of Divorce by the Court, Plaintiff learned 
that Defendant was making substantially more than $1,500.00 per 
month and, in fact, had never during the pertinent time period 
had income as low as $1,500.00 per month, and that Defendant 
had knowingly misrepresented his employment status and future 
income. 
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As a direct result of acquiring said information, on 
December 29, 1988, some 70 days after the entry of the decree, 
Plaintiff filed a Verified Motion to Set Aside the Decree, 
pursuant to Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, on 
the grounds of fraud, misrepresentation, misconduct, or at the 
very least, mistake. (R. at 89-91). 
On February 16, 1989, the Second Judicial District Court 
of Davis County issued its ruling denying Plaintiff's Motion, 
explaining its reasoning as follows: "This was a stipulated 
divorce [and] is not the proper procedure to obtain a child 
support increase." (R. at 99). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Fraud or mistake are grounds for setting aside a judgment 
under Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Defendant's representation of his income was a false 
representation of a material fact, which he made knowing it was 
false, or at least that he had insufficient knowledge upon 
which to base such a representation. It was made with the 
intention of inducing Plaintiff to agree to the settlement and, 
acting reasonably and in reliance on this representation, 
Plaintiff agreed to the settlement and was thereby injured. 
Defendant's conduct therefore constitutes fraud as defined in 
Utah. 
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The fact that the divorce was stipulated is irrelevant 
and, since Plaintiff seeks to set aside the entire Decree, and 
not just the child support, a Motion to Set Aside Decree under 
Rule 60(b) is appropriate. 
ARGUMENT 
I. DEFENDANT'S INTENTIONAL MISREPRESENTATION OF HIS 
INCOME EARNING CAPACITY TO THE COURT WAS CONDUCT 
WHICH SHOULD HAVE RESULTED IN THE SETTING ASIDE OF 
THE DIVORCE DECREE ON GROUNDS OF FRAUD, 
MISREPRESENTATION, MISCONDUCT, OR MISTAKE. 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 60(b), states: 
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may 
in the furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal 
representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding 
for the following reasons: (1) Mistake, . . . (3) fraud 
(whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), 
misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse 
party. . . . 
In Utah the elements that sufficiently establish fraud 
1) [A] representation was made; 2) concerning a presently 
existing material fact; 3) which was false; 4) which the 
one making the misrepresentation either (a) knew to be 
false, or (b) made recklessly knowing he had insufficient 
knowledge upon which to base such representation; 5) for 
the purpose of inducing the other party to act upon it; 6) 
that the other party acting reasonably and in ignorance of 
its falsity; 7) did in fact rely upon it; 8) and was 
thereby induced to act; 9) to its injury and damage. 
Cheever v. Schramm, 577 P.2d 951, 954 (Utah 1978). So long as 
the fraud is sufficiently pled through these elements, it is a 
proper ground for setting aside a divorce decree. 
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In In Re Marriage of Modnick, 33 Cal.3d 897, 191 Cal. 
Rptr. 629, 663 P.2d 187 (1983), the former husband had 
deposited money into a secret savings account and had not 
disclosed the existence of certain property to his ex-wife 
during the dissolution proceedings. Subsequent to the ex-wife 
filing a motion to set aside the judgment on the ground of 
fraud, the husband entered into negotiations regarding the 
division of the assets. Consequently, the former wife ignored 
any further action on the motion and allowed the final judgment 
of dissolution to be entered with the court. The former wife's 
attempts to settle the dispute with her ex-husband ultimately 
failed, and the former wife filed a second motion to set aside 
the final judgment on the grounds of fraud. 
The Court upheld this sort of extrinsic fraud as grounds 
to vacate, stating: 
The law is well settled that extrinsic fraud is a proper 
ground for setting aside an alimony award and a property 
settlement incorporated into a divorce decree. Extrinsic 
fraud is a broad concept that Mtend[s] to encompass almost 
any set of extrinsic circumstances which deprive a party 
of a fair adversary hearing." It "usually arises when a 
party . . . has been 'deliberately kept in ignorance of 
the action or proceeding or in some other way [is] 
fraudulently prevented from presenting his claim or 
defense'. . . ." 
Id. 663 P.2d at 191 (citations omitted); see also Clissold v. 
Clissold, 519 P.2d 241, 242 (Utah 1974). 
Likewise, in Boyce v. Boyce, 609 P.2d 928 (Utah 1980), the 
court granted a hearing on the wife's motion to set the divorce 
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decree aside where the husband misrepresented the value of the 
parties1 assets at the time of the settlement agreement and the 
assets were five times the amount disclosed. 
In each of these cases, there was a representation made 
concerning a presently existing material fact which was false, 
which the one making the misrepresentation either knew to be 
false, or made recklessly, knowing he had insufficient 
knowledge upon which to base such representation, for the 
purpose of inducing the other party to act upon it. The other 
party, acting reasonably and in ignorance of the falsity, 
relied upon it, was induced to act by it, and was injured by it. 
Similarly, Defendant misrepresented his monthly income, 
knowing it to be false or that he had insufficient knowledge 
upon which to base that representation. He did so with the 
intent that Ms. Malm would agree to all of the terms of the 
settlement. Ms. Malm, acting reasonably and in ignorance of 
the inaccuracy of that monthly figure, relied upon that 
representation and agreed to the settlement. As a result, she 
suffered economic injury. 
II. PLAINTIFF'S RULE 60(B) MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE DECREE 
WAS THE PROPER PROCEDURE FOR REMEDYING THE UNFAIR 
RESULT CAUSED BY DEFENDANT'S INTENTIONAL 
MISREPRESENTATION TO THE COURT. 
In denying Plaintiff's Motion, the Court apparently relied 
upon the fact that this was a stipulated divorce. While 
Plaintiff recognizes that a Stipulation was entered in this 
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matter, the entry of a Stipulation has no effect on Plaintiff's 
Motion to Set Aside under Rule 60(b). Pursuant to the 
Stipulation the Domestic Relations Commissioner heard evidence 
at a hearing, and entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law and a Decree of Divorce. In fact, in Finding of Fact No. 8 
the Court concluded that the "child support payment is based 
upon Defendant's change of position with this company and his 
proffer that his income will be $lf500.00 per month for the 
foreseeable future." This was a finding entered by the Court, 
not as a result of stipulation, but as a result of Defendant's 
proffer. This proffer by Defendant constituted fraud, 
misrepresentation, misconduct, or at the very east, mistake. 
The mere fact that a Stipulation had been entered into between 
the parties has no effect on Plaintiff's Motion. 
The above conclusion is further bolstered by the Utah 
Supreme Court opinion of Boyce v. Boyce, 609 P.2d 928 (Utah 
1980). In Boyce, as in this case, a divorce was granted, 
"based on a settlement between the parties." _Id. at 929. The 
plaintiff brought a motion under Rule 60(b) to set aside the 
decree, claiming that the defendant had been guilty of fraud, 
misrepresentation or misconduct in representing his net worth. 
The Supreme Court ruled that the trial court had abused its 
discretion in denying plaintiff's motion to set aside. 
Clearly, the fact that a Stipulation was entered into in this 
matter had no effect on Plaintiff's Motion. 
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The second basis for the Court's ruling appears to be that 
a Rule 60(b) motion is not the proper procedure. This Court 
apparently viewed Plaintiff's Motion as merely an attempt to 
increase child support. While an increase in child support is 
one of the obvious results sought by Plaintiff's Motion, it is 
not the only one. Defendant's financial status not only 
affected the child support amount, but permeated throughout the 
Stipulation, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and 
Decree. Defendant's financial condition affected other areas, 
such as distribution of real and personal property, alimony, 
debts and obligations, insurance, and costs and attorney fees 
considerations. Plaintiff's Motion was to set aside the entire 
Decree, not just the child support provisions. 
Additionally, the conclusion that a Rule 60(b) motion is 
not a proper procedure in this instance is contrary to 
established law. 
A liberal standard for application of Rule 60(b) in 
divorce cases is justified by the doctrine of the 
continuing jurisdiction that a divorce court has over its 
decrees. Clearly, a court should modify a prior decree 
when the interests of equity and fair dealing with the 
court and the opposing party so require. Although the 
trial court displayed great patience in dealing with this 
case, we cannot avoid the conclusion, on the basis of the 
contentions before this Court, that an injustice may have 
been perpetrated by defendant's actions. 
Boyce v. Boyce, 609 P.2d 928, 931-32 (Utah 1980). Clearly, a 
Rule 60(b) motion was appropriate in these circumstances. 
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CONCLUSION 
Mr. Malm's conduct constituted fraud, misrepresentation 
or, at the least, mistake, which prejudiced the interests of 
Ms. Malm and deprived her of a fair settlement in their 
divorce. As such, it is grounds for granting a Motion to Set 
Aside Decree under Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
Therefore, Plaintiff respectfully requests this Court to 
reverse the District Court's decision and grant Plaintiff's 
Motion to Set Aside Decree. Additionally, Plaintiff requests 
that she be awarded her costs and attorney's fees incurred in 
this action which were necessitated by Defendant's 
misrepresentations. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this jVX day of July, 1989. 
NIELSEN & SENIOR 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I mailed four copies of the 
foregoing Brief of Appellant to the following: 
Craig M. Peterson 
LITTLEFIELD & PETERSON 
Attorneys for Defendant/Respondent James S. Malm 
426 South 500 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
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United State mail, postage prepaid, this ^/cl day of July, 
1989. 
. .Kbhlman 
news for Pla/ int i f f 
1194p 
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UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 60 
issue was deemed waived and could not be 
raised in a motion for new trial. Ute-Cal Land 
Dev. Corp. v. Sather, 605 P.2d 1240 (Utah 
1980). 
Cited in National Farmers Union Property 
& Cas. Co. v. Thompson, 4 Utah 2d 7, 286 P.2d 
249 (1955); Holmes v. Nelson, 7 Utah 2d 435, 
326 P.2d 722 (1958); Howard v. Howard, 11 
Utah 2d 149, 356 P.2d 275 (1960); Nunley v. 
Stan Katz Real Estate, Inc., 15 Utah 2d 126, 
388 P.2d 798 (1964); Hanson v. General Bldrs. 
Supply Co., 15 Utah 2d 143, 389 P.2d 61 
(1964); James Mfg. Co. v. Wilson, 15 Utah 2d 
210, 390 P.2d 127 (1964); Porcupine Reservoir 
Co. v. Lloyd W. Keller Corp., 15 Utah 2d 318, 
392 P.2d 620 (1964); Watson v. Anderson, 29 
Utah 2d 36, 504 P.2d 1003 (1973); Nichols v. 
State, 554 P.2d 231 (Utah 1976); Edgar v. 
Wagner, 572 P.2d 405 (Utah 1977); Time Com. 
Fin. Corp. v. Brimhall, 575 P.2d 701 (Utah 
1978); Anderton v. Montgomery, 607 P.2d 828 
(Utah 1980); Miller Pontiac, Inc. v. Osborne, 
622 P.2d 800 (Utah 1981); Mulherin v. Inger-
soll-Rand Co., 628 P.2d 1301 (Utah 1981); 
Kohler v. Garden City, 639 P.2d 162 (Utah 
1981); Pozzolan Portland Cement Co. v. Gard-
ner, 668 P.2d 569 (Utah 1983); Nelson v. 
Jacobsen, 669 P.2d 1207 (Utah 1983); Golden 
Key Realty, Inc. v. Mantas, 699 P.2d 730 (Utah 
1985); Estate of Kay, 705 P.2d 1165 (Utah 
1985); York v. Unqualified Washington 
County Elected Officials, 714 P.2d 679 (Utah 
1986); King v. Fereday, 739 P.2d 618 (Utah 
1987); Fackrell v. Fackrell, 740 P.2d 1318 
(Utah 1987); Walker v. Carlson, 740 P.2d 1372 
(Utah Ct. App. 1987); Arnica Mut. Ins. Co. v. 
Schettler, 100 Utah Adv. Rep. 17 (Ct. App. 
1989). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 58 Am. Jur. 2d New Trial 
§§ 11 to 14, 29 et seq., 187 to 191. 
C.J.S. — 66 CJ.S. New Trial §§ 13 et seq., 
115, 116, 122 to 127. 
A.L.R. — Consent as ground of vacating 
judgment, or granting new trial, in civil case, 
after expiration of term or time prescribed by 
statute or rules of court, 3 A.L.R.3d 1191. 
Propriety and prejudicial effect of suggestion 
or comments by judge as to compromise or set-
tlement of civil case, 6 A.L.R.3d 1457. 
Necessity and propriety of counter-affidavits 
in opposition to motion for new trial in civil 
case, 7 A.L.R.3d 1000. 
Quotient verdicts, 8 A.L.R.3d 335. 
Propriety and prejudicial effect of instruc-
tions in civil case as affected by the manner in 
which they are written, 10 A.L.R.3d 501. 
Prejudicial effect of unauthorized view by 
jury in civil case of scene of accident or prem-
ises in question, 11 A.L.R.3d 918. 
Propriety and prejudicial effect of reference 
by counsel in civil case to result of former trial 
of same case, or amount of verdict therein, 15 
A.L.R.3d 1101. 
Absence of judge from courtoom during trial 
of civil case, 25 A.L.R.3d 637. 
Juror's voir dire denial or nondisclosure of 
acquaintance or relationship with attorney in 
case, or with partner or associate of such attor-
ney, as ground for new trial or mistrial, 64 
A.L.R.3d 126. 
Amendment, after expiration of time for fil-
ing motion for new trial, in civil case, of motion 
made in due time, 69 A.L.R.3d 845. 
Authority of state court to order jury trial in 
civil case where jury has been waived or not 
demanded by parties, 9 A.L.R.4th 1041. 
Deafness of juror as ground for impeaching 
verdict, or securing new trial or reversal on 
appeal, 38 A.L.R.4th 1170. 
Jury trial waiver as binding on later state 
civil trial, 48 A.L.R.4th 747. 
Court reporter's death or disability prior to 
transcribing notes as grounds for reversal or 
new trial, 57 A.L.R.4th 1049. 
Key Numbers. — New Trial «=» 13 et seq., 
110, 116. 
Rule 60. Relief from judgment or order. 
(a) Clerical mistakes. Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other 
parts of the record and errors therein arising from oversight or omission may 
be corrected by the court at any time of its own initiative or on the motion of 
any party and after such notice, if any, as the court orders. During the pen-
dency of an appeal, such mistakes may be so corrected before the appeal is 
docketed in the appellate court, and thereafter while the appeal is pending 
may be so corrected with leave of the appellate court. 
(b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly discovered evi-
dence; fraud, etc. On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may 
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Rule 60 UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
in the furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a 
final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, 
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence 
which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a 
new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrin-
sic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse party; 
(4) when, for any cause, the summons in an action has not been personally 
served upon the defendant as required by Rule 4(e) and the defendant has 
failed to appear in said action; (5) the judgment is void; (6) the judgment has 
been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is 
based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that 
the judgment should have prospective application; or (7) any other reason 
justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. The motion shall be made 
within a reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2), (3), or (4), not more than 3 
months after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken. A 
motion under this Subdivision (b) does not affect the finality of a judgment or 
suspend its operation. This rule does not limit the power of a court to enter-
tain an independent action to relieve a party from a judgment, order or pro-
ceeding or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court. The procedure for 
obtaining any relief from a judgment shall be by motion as prescribed in these 
rules or by an independent action. 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is patterned 
after, and similar to, Rule 60, F.R.C.P. 
Cross-References. — Fee for filing motion 
to set aside judgment, §§ 78-3-16.5, 78-4-24, 
78-6-14; Appx. G, Code of Judicial Administra-
tion. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Appeals. 
Clerical mistakes. 
—Computation of damages. 
—Correction after appeal. 
—Date of judgment. 
Void judgment. 
—Estate record. 
—Inherent power of courts. 
—Intent of court and parties. 
—Judicial error distinguished. 
—Order prepared by counsel. 
—Predating of new trial motion. 
Default judgment. 
Jurisdiction. 
Other reasons. 
—"Any other reason justifying relief." 
Default judgment. 
Impossibility of compliance with order. 
Incompetent counsel. 
Lack of due process. 
Merits of case. 
Mistake or inadvertence. 
Real party in interest. 
Requirements. 
—Effect of set-aside judgment. 
Admissions. 
—Fraud. 
Divorce action. 
—Independent action. 
Constitutionality of taxes. 
Divorce decree. 
Fraud or duress. 
Motion distinguished. 
—Invalid summons. 
Amendment without notice. 
—Mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable 
neglect. 
Default judgment. 
Delayed motion for new trial. 
Failure to file cost bill. 
Failure to file notice of appeal. 
Failure to receive notice an4_findings. 
Illness. 
Inconvenience. 
Merits of claim. 
Negligence of attorney. 
No claim for relief. 
Trial court's discretion; 
Unemployment compensation appeal. 
Workmen's compensation appeal. 
—Newly discovered evidence. 
Burden of proof. 
Discretion not abused. 
—Procedure. 
Notice to parties. 
—Res judicata. 
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IN THE 2ND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
Civil No. 
43071 
HEARING 
-0O0-
TAMERA KAY MALM, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JAMES S. MALM, 
Defendant. 
-0O0-
BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 5th day of October, 
1988, the above Hearing was heard before Judge Maurice 
Richards, at the Davis County Courthouse, Farmington, Utah, 
Room 215. 
CERTIFIED 
COW 
SANDRA GARDINER 
CSR NO. 2 9 8 
INDEPENDENT REPORTING 
SERVICE 
Certified Shorthand Reporters 
1200 Beneficial Life Tower 
36 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84TT! 
(801) 538-2333 
1 divided. 
2 MR, CATHCART: The liabilities, the plaintiff will 
3 pay, as I said, for her automobile, the Sear's debt and any 
4 other debts that she's incurred since separation. The 
5 plaintiff will pay the American First consolidation loan. 
6 1 Is it American First? 
7 MR. PETERSON: Um-hum. The signature. 
8 J MR. CATHCART: And the — the American First 
9 signature loan and the Visa Ma — or the MasterCard debt 
10 and — and each of the parties will pay their attorneys' 
U I fees and costs that they have incurred in this matter. 
12 Anything I've missed or — 
13 MR. PETERSON: Retirement. 
14 MR. CATHCART: The — counsel for the parties will 
15 determine the defendant's retirement at YESCO. The — by 
16 December 31st, 1988, the defendant will pay to the 
17 plaintiff three eighths of his vested interest in 
18 retirement. 
19 THE COURT: Both — 
20 MR. CATHCART: And alimony is waived. 
21 THE COURT: I need to have you tell me how much he 
22 earns in gross, if you will. 
23 MR. CATHCART: He earns right — he earns today, 
24 approximately 2,000 gross. She earns approximately 972 
25 gross. It's anticipated that on October 17, his gross will 
Sandra Gardiner• Certified Shorthand Reporter 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
go to 1500. 
THE COURT: Go to 1500? 
MR. CATHCART: Yes. 
MR. PETERSON: Your Honor, we'd like to have that in 
the record that our agreement to child support is based on 
the fact that he knows his income will be reduced and in 
spite of that, the child support is still set at 175 a 
month. 
MR. CATHCART: And we have no — 
MR. PETERSON: And that would not change the 
circumstances. 
MR. CATHCART: And we have no objection to that. 
We're paying more child support as the schedule would call 
for at $1500 per month, that includes — that's appropriate I 
for the benefit of his children. 
THE PETERSON: Well, the plaintiff just changed 
jobs, so we're — 
MR. CATHCART: She is currently making $404.25 
every two weeks. 
MR. PETERSON: That works out to be 972 we gave in 
the information. 
MR. CATHCART: That's what I thought, but I can't 
find it, the chart here. 
MR. PETERSON: Oh, I've got it. 
MR. CATHCART: $910 gross income per month. 
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TERRY L. CATHCART, #4809 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
110 West Center Street 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 
Telephone: (801) 295-2391 
THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
TAMERA KAY MALM, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JAMES S. MALM, 
Defendant. ', 
\ FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
1 CONCLUSIONS OF &AW 
Civil No. 43071 
\ Judge Douglas L Cornaby 
The above matter came on for hearing on Wednesday, the 5th 
day of October, 1988, the Honorable Maurice Richards, Domestic 
Relations Commissioner, presiding. Plaintiff appeared in person 
and by and through Terry L. Cathcart, counsel of record. The 
Defendant appeared in person and by and through Craig M. 
Peterson, counsel of record. The parties stipulated that the _ 
Commissioner could sit as Judge Pro Tempore, and the- parties' 
Stipulation for settlement was duly entered. 
The Court heard evidence in support of Plaintiff's Complaint 
for divorce, and now being fully advised in the premises and for 
good cause appearing, makes and enters the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. JURISDICTION: This court has jurisdiction over the 
parties and the subject matter as a result of the following facts 
and circumstances: 
RBCEiVEo 
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A. RESIDENCY: Plaintiff is now a bona fide resident 
of Davis County, State of Utah, and has been such for a period in 
excess of three months immediately preceding the commencement of 
this action.* 
B. MARRIAGE STATISTICS: Plaintiff and Defendant are 
wife and husband, having been married at Layton, (Davis County), 
Utah, on the 17th day of September, 1982. 
2. CUSTODY: Plaintiff is a fit and proper parent and 
should be awarded the care, custody and control of the only minor 
children born as issue of this marriage, or expected as a result 
of this marriage, to-wit: 
JAMIE LYN d.o.b. 1/14/84 
KIMBERLY ANN d.o.b. 10/31/86 
3. VISITATION: Defendant should be awarded reasonable 
weekly visitation with the parties1 minor children, at regularly 
scheduled times and on regularly scheduled days, or subject to 
reasonable advance notification to Plaintiff of not less than 48 
hours when such visitation would be at other than those regularly 
scheduled days and times. Such visitation should be ordered to 
include the first and third weekends of each month, commencing at 
5:00 o'clock p.m. on Friday and terminating at 5:00 o'clock p.m. 
on Sunday. In addition, Defendant should be awarded the follow-
ing periods of visitation: 
A. Every Father's Day and Defendant's Birthday plus 
federal and state holidays normally celebrated within the State 
of Utah which fall on the Friday before or the Monday after 
Defendant's regular weekend visitation, with pickup and return 
times adjusted by 24 hours from the weekend hours, as required; 
and 
B. Alternating Thanksgiving and Easter/Spring vacation 
periods from school at the then location of the parties' minor 
children. Such visitation should be ordered to alternate in such 
a manner that the Plaintiff has custody of the children during 
the Spring vacation period on all odd-numbered years and Thanks-
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giving on even-numbered years, while Defendant exercises said 
custodial visitation during the Spring vacation on even-numbered 
years and Thanksgiving on odd-numbered years; and 
C. From noon on Christmas Day until 8:30 p.m. December 
27th; and 
D. When Defendant's normal visitation falls upon 
Mother's Day or Plaintiff's birthday, then Defendant's visitation 
for those days should be forfeited; and 
E. For a period of not less than TWO nor more than 
FOUR weeks during the summer, to be arranged commensurate with 
Defendant's vacation from his employment. Additionally, should 
Defendant not have available four weeks of vacation during that 
summer period, then Defendant may also exercise visitation with 
the children for one other week during that period, that week to 
be arranged between Plaintiff and Defendant; and 
F. During periods of Defendant's extended visitation 
with the children, Plaintiff should be awarded reciprocal 
visitation on the second and fourth weekends for the same times 
that Defendant would normally have the children on the first and 
third weekends, unless Defendant is out of town with the children 
on vacation, in which case that visitation should be ordered re-
scheduled to a mutually convenient time. Similarly, during 
Plaintiff's extended summer vacation from her employment, if she 
is out of town on vacation with the children, then Defendant's 
visitation during that time frame should be ordered rescheduled 
to a mutually convenient time; and 
G. All visitation provided by this paragraph should be 
ordered to avoid interference with the children's normal school 
schedules, and no adjustment should be provided to give 
additional days as a result of school commitments falling on 
those visitation days; and 
H. At any time that Plaintiff and the minor children 
are out of state on vacation for a period in excess of one week, 
then Defendant should be awarded the option of visiting said 
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children for up to two daytime visits per week at the location of 
said vacation; and 
I. The children should be allowed to call the non-
custodial" "rent a reasonable^ m:::.c.. of times per „. wee'.:, \l<h the 
parent receiving calls paying the appropriate long distance 
charges, if applicable; and 
J. In the event that Defendant does not arrive*at 
Plaintiff's home within 15 minutes of these scheduled pick-up 
times for the commencement of any visitation provided herein, 
then such visitation should be deemed forfeited and Plaintiff not 
required to forestall other plans which she might have for that 
time frame. 
4. REAL PROPERTY: The real property owned by the parties 
and located at 1940 South Main, Clearfield, Utah 84015, should 
be ordered to be sold and any equity from that sale to be divided 
equally between the parties. Should that sale not be possible, 
and a foreclosure on the property results, then any liability 
from the foreclosure on the property should be ordered to be 
divided equally between the parties. 
5. PERSONAL PROPERTY: In consideration of the debt 
allocation, alimony, child support and other provisions of this 
action, the personal property of the marriage should be awarded 
as between the parties on the following basis: 
A. PLAINTIFF should be awarded as her sole and 
separate property the following items: 
(1) All items of her personal clothing and 
effects; 
(2) The 1982 Chevrolet Cavalier and its 
associated debt; 
(3) The console stereo; 
(4) The stereo components and large speakers; 
(5) The dining room set; 
(6) The lawn mower; 
(7) The refrigerator; 
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(8) The washer and dryer; and 
(9) The Amway business kit. 
B. DEFENDANT should be awarded as his sole and 
perorate property the f^ilc.ing items: 
(1) All items of his personal clothing and 
effects; 
(2) The 1979 Jcc^TCJ 5; and 
(3) All of the remaining furniture in the 
parties1 residence. 
C. All other personal property has been previously 
allocated between the parties, and ownership of such should be 
confirmed in that party having possession as of the date of the 
default hearing in this action. 
D. Additionally, Defendant should be ordered to repair 
and return Plaintiff's VCR to working condition. 
6. MILITARY RETIREMENT: Plaintiff should be awarded a 
percentage of Defendant's military retirement based upon the 
following formula: 
(H) x (y/A) x (B) = Plaintiff's share (monthly) 
WHERE "A" is the total of Defendant's years' 
service prior to his retirement from military 
service, and 
WHERE " B" is the net amount of Defendant's 
retirement pay after the payment of state and 
federal taxes generated by the addition of this 
pay to his total income, with payments made to 
Plaintiff directly by Air Force Accounting and 
Finance Center each month as provided by the 
Uniform Services Former Spouses' Protection Act 
(Public Law 97-252). 
WHERE "y" is the number of years of military 
service accrued during the marriage, 
7. RETIREMENT: Defendant will acquire an evaluation of 
his retirement benefits from his civilian employment and their 
present value and make a cash settlement payment to Plaintiff of 
her one-half interest in the retirement that has accrued during 
the marriage.. Until such time as the final Decree in this 
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matter is entered and such retirement benefits are allocated, 
Defendant should be enjoined from removing funds from the program 
or from borrowing against his interest therein. 
8. CHIL^*Cnt>nORT: On the 'ba^ f's^ 'cf Defendant's present 
1 1
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income and Plaintiff's limited earning power, and further in 
consideration of the other aspects of the property settlement, 
debt>••?*•! locat ion and insu,r>rre provisions con t^'r^cd^ herein, 
Defendant should be ordered to pay to Plaintiff as and for child 
support during the minority of the parties' children and through 
high school graduation, the sum of $175.00 per month per child 
for a total of $350,00 per month, payable in equal installments 
on the Fifth and Twentieth days of each month thereafter. This 
child support payment is based upon Defendant's change of 
position with his company and his proffer that his income will be 
$1,500.00 per month for the foreseeable future. 
9. ALIMONY: In consideration of the property distri-
bution, debt allocation, insurance, child support and other 
provisions in this action, and the parties1 agreements to waive 
claims therefore, no alimony should be awarded to either party. 
10. DEBTS AND OBLIGATIONS: As a material consideration for 
the child support, alimony, property distribution, insurance and 
other provisions of this action, and the relative incomes and 
present earning powers of the parties, each party should be 
awarded the following debts and obligations of the marriage and 
ordered to hold harmless and defend the other from any claims 
arising out of said obligations: 
A. PLAINTIFF should be awarded the following debts and 
obligations: 
(1) Those debts and obligations incurred by 
Plaintiff since the separation of the parties; 
(2) The debt associated with the 1982 Chevrolet 
Cavalier in an approximate amount of $4,600.00; 
and 
(3) The Sears credit card in an approximate 
amount of $450.00. 
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B. DEFENDANT should be awarded the following debts and 
obligations: 
(1) Those debts and obligations incurred by 
Defendant singe^thc; ^ ccparation of the^ar^ics; 
(2) The debt arising out of any mortgage on the 
parties1 residence; 
(3) All utilities, costs, etc.,: "related to the 
parties1 residence; 
(4) The America First Credit Union Line of Credit 
loan in an approximate amount of $1,030.00; 
(5) The America First Credit Union consolidation 
loan in an approximate amount of $3,100.00; and 
(6) The Citibank Mastercard in an approximate 
amount of $1,400.00. 
11. INCOME TAX RETURN: Each of the parties should be 
ordered to prepare separate State and Federal Income Tax returns 
for income earned during calendar year 1988. 
12. INCOME TAX DEDUCTIONS: For purposes of filing State 
and Federal income tax returns, Plaintiff should be awarded the 
dependency deduction arising from the younger of the parties' 
children. Defendant should be awarded the dependency deduction 
arising from the older of the parties1 children. Additionally, 
Plaintiff should be ordered to file for social security numbers 
for the minor children to be used on the income tax returns. 
However, all deductions awarded to Defendant should be 
conditioned upon his being current in all child support payments 
for the year in question as of December 31st of that tax year and 
should revert to Plaintiff automatically without requirement for 
notice should that condition not be met.' 
13. HEALTH AND ACCIDENT INSURANCE: Defendant should be 
ordered to provide health, accident and dental insurance for the 
benefit of the parties' minor children, with deductible amounts 
and coverage equal to or better than those in existence as of 
February l, 1988, for so long as group coverage is available 
through his current or any subsequent place of employment. 
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Further, Defendant should be ordered to pay for one-half of any 
deductible amounts for such medical or dental services or 
prescriptions related thereto that are not paid by his insurance 
co^er*>^ and to provide ..P7^ 'irti ff with executed ^cl'z irr* forms and 
other assistance necessary to insure the prompt payment of all 
such claims. Plaintiff should also be ordered to maintain 
health, accident and dental insurance for' the benefit of the 
minor children so long as such coverage is available through her 
employment at a reasonable cost. Any non covered items should be 
ordered to be divided equally between the parties. 
14. LIFE INSURANCE: Defendant should be ordered to 
continue in full force and effect life insurance policies in a 
minimum amount of $60,000 unencumbered value, and to pay any 
premiums arising out of said coverage until the minor children 
reach age 21 or complete their formal education, with the minor 
children being named as beneficiaries under those policies. 
15. GROUNDS: During the course of the marriage the parties 
have become unable to resolve or reconcile their differences, 
these irreconcilable differences leading to the complete 
breakdown of the marriage relationship. 
16. COSTS AND ATTORNEY'S FEES: In consideration of the 
support, alimony and property distribution provisions contained 
herein, and the relative earning power of the parties, each of 
the parties should be ordered to pay their own attorney's fees 
and costs. 
17. ORDER TO WITHHOLD AND DELIVER: Pursuant to Sections 
78-45d-2 and 30-3-5.1 of the Utah Code Annotated (1953, as 
amended) an Order to Withhold and Deliver child support payments 
should be prepared and maintained in the file of this action 
thereby requiring Defendant's employer to withhold and deliver 
child support payments as awarded by this court, with the 
provision that such order will not be acted upon until such time 
as an appropriate affidavit is filed by Plaintiff alleging that 
Defendant is delinquent in payment of support as ordered by the 
court. 
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18. SIGN ALL PAPERS: Each of the parties should be ordered 
to sign all papers, documents, titles, deeds, etc., necessary to 
effectuate the. transfer of real and personal property by and 
between the parties - herein set forth. 
From the foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT, the Court makes and 
enters the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
A. DIVORCE GRANTED: Plaintiff should be awarded a Decree 
of Divorce from Defendant, thereby dissolving the bonds of 
matrimony presently existing between the parties. Such Decree 
should become final on entry upon the records of the Court. 
B. CUSTODY, SUPPORT, ALIMONY AND VISITATION: The custody 
of and visitation with the parties1 minor children, the child 
support, and the alimony should be ordered in accordemce with the 
Findings herein. 
C. DEBTS AND PROPERTY DISTRIBUTION: In making the alimony 
and child support findings above, the Court has taken into 
account the allocation of debts, the distribution of property, 
and the insurance provisions contained herein; each such item 
should be ordered in accordance with those Findings. 
D. MISCELLANEOUS: The costs and attorney's fees, life 
insurance, health insurance and other miscellaneous provisions 
should be ordered in accordance with the Findings herein. 
E. WITHHOLDING ORDER: An Order to Withhold and Deliver 
child support payments should be entered in accordance with the 
appropriate statutes, and retained in the file for use if and 
when necessary. 
DATED this day of October, 1988. 
MAURICE RICHARDS, 
District Judge Pro Tempore 
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APPROVEI TO FORM: 
'IG M/ PETERSON, 
Attorney for Defendant 
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TERRY L. CATHCART, #4809 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
110 West Center Street 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 
Telephone: (801) 295-2391 
THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
TAMERA KAY MALM, ) 
) DECREE OF DIVORCE 
Plaintiff, J ' 
vs. ) 
) Civil No, 43071 
JAMES S. MALM, ) 
) Judge Douglas L Cornaby 
Defendant. ) 
The above matter came on for hearing on Wednesday, the 5th 
day of October, 1988, the Honorable Maurice Richards, Domestic 
Relations Commissioner, presiding. Plaintiff appeared in person 
and by and through Terry L. Cathcart, counsel of record. The 
Defendant appeared in person and by and through Craig M. 
Peterson, counsel of record. The parties stipulated that the 
Commissioner could sit as Judge Pro Tempore, and the" parties1 
Stipulation for settlement was duly entered. 
The Court heard evidence in support of Plaintiff's 
COMPLAINT for divorce, and having previously entered the FINDINGS 
OF FACT and CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, and now being fully advised in 
the premises, makes and enters the? fbllowing: 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
1. DIVORCE GRANTED: Plaintiff is hereby granted a Decree 
of Divorce from Defendant, thereby severing the bonds of 
matrimony heretofore existing between the parties. Said Decree 
to become final upon entry in the official records of the clerk 
of Davis County, State of Utah, automatically and without further 
action by the parties. 
2. CUSTODY: Plaintiff is a fit and proper parent and is 
awarded the care, custody and control of the only minor children 
born as issue of this marriage, or expected as a result of this 
marriage, to-wit: 
JAMIE LYN d.o.b. 1/14/84 
KIMBERLY ANN d.o.b, 10/31/86 
3. VISITATION: Defendant is awarded reasonable weekly 
visitation with the parties1 minor children, at regularly 
scheduled times and on regularly scheduled days, or subject to 
reasonable advance notification to Plaintiff of not less than 48 
hours when such visitation would be at other than those regularly 
scheduled days and times. Such visitation is ordered to include 
the first and third weekends of each month, commencing at 5:00 
o'clock p.m. on Friday and terminating at 5:00 o'clock p.m. on 
Sunday. In addition, Defendant is awarded the following periods 
of visitation: 
A. Every Father's Day and Defendant's Birthday plus 
federal and state holidays normally celebrated within the State 
of Utah which fall on the Friday before or the Monday after 
Defendant's regular weekend visitation, with pickup and return 
times adjusted by 24 hours from the weekend hours, as required; 
and 
B. Alternating Thanksgiving and Easter/Spring vacation 
periods from school at the then location of the parties' minor 
children. Such visitation is ordered to alternate, JLn such a 
manner that the Plaintiff has custody of the children during the 
Spring vacation period on all odd-numbered years and Thanks-
giving on even-numbered years, while Defendant exercises said 
custodial visitation during the Spring vacation on even-numbered 
years and Thanksgiving on odd-numbered years; and 
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C. From noon on Christmas Day until 8:30 p.m. December 
27th; and 
D. When Defendant's normal visitation falls upon 
Mother's Day or Plaintiff's birthday, then Defendant's visitation 
for those days is forfeited; and 
E. For a period of not less than TWO nor more than 
FOUR weeks during the summer, to be arranged commensurate with 
Defendant's vacation from his employment. Additionally, should 
Defendant not have available four weeks of vacation during that 
summer period, then Defendant may also exercise visitation with 
the children for one other week during that period, that week to 
be arranged between Plaintiff and Defendant; and 
F. During periods of Defendant's extended visitation 
with the children, Plaintiff is awarded reciprocal visitation on 
the second and fourth weekends for the same times that Defendant 
would normally have the children on the first and third weekends, 
unless Defendant is out of town with the children on vacation, in 
which case that visitation is ordered rescheduled to a mutually 
convenient time. Similarly, during Plaintiff's extended summer 
vacation from her employment, if she is out of town on vacation 
with the children, then Defendant's visitation during that time 
frame is ordered rescheduled to a mutually convenient time; and 
G. All visitation provided by this paragraph is 
ordered to avoid interference with the children's normal school 
schedules, and no adjustment is provided to give additional days 
as a result of school commitments falling on those visitation 
days; and 
H. At any time that Plaintiff and the minor children 
are out of state on vacation for a period in excess, of one week, 
then Defendant is awarded*the option of visiting^aid children 
for up to two daytime visits per week at the location of said 
vacation; and 
I. The children are allowed to call the non-custodial 
parent a reasonable number of times per week, with the parent 
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receiving calls paying the appropriate long distance charges, if 
applicable; and 
J. In the event that Defendant does not arrive at 
Plaintiff's home within 15 minutes of these scheduled pick-up 
times for the commencement of any visitation provided herein, 
then such visitation is deemed forfeited and Plaintiff not 
required to forestall other plans which she might have for that 
time frame, 
4. REAL PROPERTY: The real property owned by the parties 
and located at 1940 South Main, Clearfield, Utah 84015, is 
ordered to be sold and any equity from that sale to be divided 
equally between the parties. Should that sale not be possible, 
and a foreclosure on the property results, then any liability 
from the foreclosure on the property is ordered to be divided 
equally between the parties. 
5. PERSONAL PROPERTY: In consideration of the debt 
allocation, alimony, child support and other provisions of this 
action, the personal property of the marriage is awarded as 
between the parties on the following basis: 
A. PLAINTIFF is awarded as her sole and separate 
property the following items: 
(1) All items of her personal clothing and 
effects; 
(2) The 1982 Chevrolet Cavalier ^and its 
associated debt; 
(3) The console stereo; 
(4) The stereo components and large speakers; 
(5) The dining room set; 
(6) The lawn mower; 
(7) The refrigerator; 
(8) The washer and dryer; and 
(9) The Amway business kit. 
B. DEFENDANT is awarded as his sole and separate 
property the following items: 
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(1) All items of his personal clothing and 
effects; 
(2) The 1979 Jeep CJ 5; and 
(3) All of the remaining furniture in the 
parties1 residence. 
C. All other personal property has been previously 
allocated between the parties, and ownership of such is 
confirmed in that party having possession as of the date of the 
default hearing in this action. 
D. Additionally, Defendant is ordered to repair and 
return Plaintiff's VCR to working condition. 
6. MILITARY RETIREMENT: Plaintiff is awarded a percentage 
of Defendant's military retirement based upon the following 
formula: 
(H) x (y/A) x (B) = Plaintiff's share (monthly) 
WHERE "A" is the total of Defendant's years' 
service prior to his retirement from military 
service, and 
WHERE "B" is the net amount of Defendant's 
retirement pay after the payment of state and 
federal taxes generated by the addition of this 
pay to his total income, with payments made to 
Plaintiff directly by Air Force Accounting and 
Finance Center each month as provided by the 
Uniform Services Former Spouses' Protection Act 
(Public Law 97-252). 
WHERE f,y" is the number of years of military 
service accrued during the marriage. 
7. RETIREMENT: Defendant" will acquire an evaluation of 
his retirement benefits from his civilian employment and their 
present value and make a cash settlement payment to Plaintiff of 
her one-half interest in the retirement that has accrued during 
the marriage. Until such time as the final Decree in this matter 
is entered and such retirement benefits are allocated, Defendant 
is enjoined from removing funds from the program or from 
borrowing against his interest therein. 
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8. CHILD SUPPORT: Defendant is ordered to pay to Plaintiff 
as and for child support the sum of $175.00 per month per child 
for a total sum of $350.00 per month, payable in equal 
installments on the Fifth and Twentieth days of each month. 
9. ALIMONY: In consideration of the property distri-
bution, debt allocation, insurance, child support and other 
provisions in this action, and the parties^ agreements to waive 
claims therefore, no alimony is awarded to either party. 
10. DEBTS AND OBLIGATIONS: As a material consideration for 
the child support, alimony, property distribution, insurance and 
other provisions of this action, and the relative incomes and 
present earning powers of the parties, each party is awarded the 
following debts and obligations of the marriage and ordered to 
hold harmless and defend the other from any claims arising out of 
said obligations: 
A. PLAINTIFF is awarded the following debts and 
obligations: 
(1) Those debts and obligations incurred by 
Plaintiff since the separation of the parties; 
(2) The debt associated with the 1982 Chevrolet 
Cavalier in an approximate amount of $4,600.00; 
and 
(3) The Sears credit card in an approximate 
amount of $450.00. 
B. DEFENDANT is awarded the following debts and 
obligations: 
(1) Those debts and obligations incurred by 
Defendant since the separation of the parties; 
(2) The debt arising out of any mortgage on the 
parties1 residence; 
(3) All utilities, costs, etc., related to the 
parties1 residence; 
(4) The America First Credit Union Line of Credit 
loan in an approximate amount of $1,030.00; 
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(5) The America First Credit Union consolidation 
loan in an approximate amount of $3,100.00; and 
(6) The Citibank Mastercard in an approximate 
amount of $1,400.00. 
11. INCOME TAX RETURN: Each of the parties is ordered to 
prepare separate State and Federal Income Tax returns for income 
earned during calendar year 1988. 
12. INCOME TAX DEDUCTIONS: For purposes of filing State 
and Federal income tax returns, Plaintiff is awarded the 
dependency deduction arising from the younger of the parties1 
children. Defendant is awarded the dependency deduction arising 
from the older of the parties' children. Additionally, 
Plaintiff is ordered to file for social security numbers for the 
minor children to be used on the income tax returns. However, 
all deductions awarded to Defendant are conditioned upon his 
being current in all child support payments for the year in 
question as of December 31st of that tax year and should revert 
to Plaintiff automatically without requirement for notice should 
that condition not be met. 
13. HEALTH AND ACCIDENT INSURANCE: Defendant is ordered to 
provide health, accident and dental insurance for the benefit of 
the parties1 minor children, with deductible amounts and coverage 
equal to or better than those in existence as of February 1, 
1988, for so long as group coverage is available through his 
current or any subsequent place of employment. Further, Defen-
dant is ordered to pay for one-half of any deductible amounts for 
such medical or dental services or prescriptions related thereto 
that are not paid by his insurance coverage and to provide Plain-
tiff with executed claim forms and other assistance necessary to 
insure the prompt payment of all such claims. plaintiff should^ 
also be ordered to maintain health, accident and dental insurance 
for the benefit of the minor children so long as such coverage is 
available through her employment at a reasonable cost. Any non 
covered items is ordered to be divided equally between the 
parties. 
7 
14. LIFE INSURANCE: Defendant is ordered to continue in 
full force and effect life insurance policies in a minimum amount 
of $60,000 unencumbered value, and to pay any premiums arising 
out of said coverage until the minor children reach age 21 or 
complete their formal education, with the minor children being 
named as beneficiaries under those policies. 
15. COSTS AND ATTORNEY'S FEES: Ii^  consideration of the 
support, alimony and property distribution provisions contained 
herein, and the relative earning power of the parties, each of 
the parties is ordered to pay their own attorneyfs fees and 
costs. 
16. ORDER TO WITHHOLD AND DELIVER: Pursuant to Sections 
78-45d-2 and 30-3-5.1 of the Utah Code Annotated (*1953, as 
amended) an Order to Withhold and Deliver child support payments 
will be prepared and maintained in the file of this action 
thereby requiring Defendant's employer to withhold and deliver 
child support payments as awarded by this court, with the 
provision that such order will not be acted upon until such time 
as an appropriate affidavit is filed by Plaintiff alleging that 
Defendant is delinquent in payment of support as ordered by the 
court. 
17. SIGN ALL PAPERS: Each of the parties is ordered to 
sign all papers, documents, titles, deeds, etc., necessary to 
effectuate the transfer of real and personal property by and 
between the parties as herein set forth. 
DATED this \°\+U day of October, 1988. 
- i ^ 
MAURICE RICHARDS, 
District Judge Pro Tempore 
APPROVED AS TO FORMj^- ~ ^ ^ 
jettAIG/M. PETERSON^ 
A t t o / n e y for Defendant 
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Jay R. Mohlman (5113) 
NIELSEN & SENIOR 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
1100 Beneficial Life Tower 
36 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-1900 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
TAMERA KAY MALM, ] 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JAMES S. MALM, 
Defendant. ] 
) VERIFIED MOTION TO 
1 SET ASIDE DECREE 
' Civil No. 43071 
i Judge Douglas L. Cornaby 
Plaintiff moves the Court pursuant to Rule 60(b) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure for an order setting aside the 
Decree of Divorce that has been entered in this matter. This 
motion is based on the following: 
1. This action was initiated on or about February 22f 
1988 by the filing of a complaint by Plaintiff. 
2. After service of said complaint on March 2, 1988 an 
answer was filed on March 22, 1988 and an amended answer was filed 
on or about March 30, 1988. 
3. A hearing was held on October 5, 1988, the Honorable 
Maurice Richards, Domestic Relations Commissioner, presiding. 
Both parties, with their counsel, were present. The parties 
stipulated that the Commissioner could sit as judge pro tempore. 
Evidence was heard at the hearing, the parties stipulated and 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and a Decree of Divorce 
was entered pursuant thereto. At that hearing, it was represented 
by Defendant that he had recently changed positions with his 
employer and he expressly represented that his income was to be 
$1,500.00 per month. 
4. The express representation by Defendant of the 
amount of his income in his new position was false, it was false 
at the time it was made, and Defendant knowingly made the false 
representation for the purpose of causing Plaintiff to rely upon 
it and to result in Plaintiff's agreement to accept a lesser 
amount of child support than she would otherwise have accepted. 
Defendant's conduct amounts to fraud upon Plaintiff and upon the 
court. Alternatively, the representation of Defendant constitutes 
a mistake sufficient to have the decree set aside under Rule 
60(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
DATED this 2 ^ day of December, 1988. 
NIELSEN & SENIOR 
Mohlman / 
eys for Plaintiff 
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VERIFICATION 
I, Tamera Kay Malm, the Plaintiff in the above-entitled 
action, have read the foregoing Motion to Set Aside Decree and 
verify that its contents are true and correct to the best of my 
knowledge. 
DATED this J?T day of December, 1988. 
Tamera Kay Malm 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE) 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this s?$~- day of 
December, 1988. 
Rotary Public 
My Commission expires: Residing at: 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on this 234^ day of December, 1988, 
I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Verified Motion 
to Set Aside Decree by United States mails, postage prepaid, 
addressed as follows: 
Craig M. Peterson, Esq. 
426 South 500 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Attorney for Defendant. 
58741 
In the Second Judicial District Court 
in and for the 
County of Davis, State of Utah 
TAMERA -R7CY MALM, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JAMES S. MALM, 
Defendant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
RULING ON 
MOTION TO 
DECREE 
Civil No. 
PLAINTIFF'S 
SET ASIDE 
43071 
The plaintiff's motion to set aside the decree came before 
the court pursuant to Rule 4-501 of the Code of Judicial 
Administration with Jay R. Mohlman for the plaintiff and Craig M. 
Peterson for the defendant* 
The plaintiff's motion to set aside the decree is denied. 
This was a stipulated divorce. This is not the proper procedure 
to obtain a child support increase. 
Dated Februai^ 16, 1989. 
BY THE COURT: 
2<* ^  
Certificate of Mailing: / 
This is to certify that the undersigned mailed a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing TfcviYiVkg /to 3^ y 9.. ttoKLraact, 110Q 
Beneficial Life Tower, 36 South State Street, Salt Lake City, 
Utah 84111 and Craig M. Peterson, 426 South 500 East, Salt Lake 
City, Utah 84102 on February 16, 1989. 
